BIBFRAME Work

Title

The hired gun mechanism

Type

• Text
• Monograph

Contribution

• Gee, Laura Katherine (contributor)
• National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
• Andreoni, James (author)

Language

• English

Classification

LCC: HB1 (Assigner: dlc) (Status: used by assigner)

Content

• text

Supplementary content

• bibliography

Summary

"We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Authorized Access Point

Andreoni, James. The hired gun mechanism

Admin Metadata

• Date: 2026-09-11T20:18:03.870221+00:00
• Agent: cbc
• Status: c
• Derived from: 16899918

Admin Metadata

• Date: 2026-09-11
• Cataloger id: Unknown
• Description level: http://id.loc.gov/ontologies/bibframe-2-6-0/
• Description language: eng
• Description authentication: pcc