BIBFRAME Work

Title

Informational rents, macroeconomic rents, and efficient bailouts

Type

  • Monograph
  • Text

Language

Classification

LCC: HB1 (Assigner: dlc) (Status: used by assigner)

Content

Supplementary content

Summary

"We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a security design problem and we show that warrants and preferred stocks are the optimal instruments. Minimizing macroeconomic rents requires the government to condition implementation on sufficient participation. Informational rents always impose a cost, but if macroeconomic rents are large, efficient recapitalizations can be profitable"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Authorized Access Point

Philippon, Thomas. Informational rents, macroeconomic rents, and efficient bailouts

Admin Metadata

  • Date: 2026-09-11T20:27:47.454560+00:00
  • Agent: cbc
  • Status: c
  • Derived from: 16754084

Admin Metadata

  • Date: 2026-09-11
  • Cataloger id: Unknown
  • Description level: http://id.loc.gov/ontologies/bibframe-2-6-0/
  • Description language: eng
  • Description authentication: pcc

Alternative Formats

Blue Core Actions

  • Load to Marva Marva loads Instances, not Works. Open one of this Work's Instances and load that into Marva instead.
  • Load to Sinopia
  • Export to Catalog Only Instances can be exported. Open one of this Work's Instances and export that instead.